My Favorite Manuel Topics: Bullpen Mismanagement

In Part 1, of Mr. Musser’s Manuel Post-Mortem, the focus was on Manuel’s lineup construction flaws.  I know Mr. Musser plans to continue into Part 2 and focus on his bullpen management, but I’m also going to write about it right now.  I’m certain that there is enough data from which to draw, and I know that our memories will likely lead us to different examples.  Just being able to recall some of the things I’m about to mention causes me to laugh at our ridiculous scrutiny of the manager while still being absolutely furious about his mistakes to this day. 

SAVING THE BEST FOR LAST

One of my favorite things to criticize Manuel about (and by favorite I mean the most utterly frustrating thing I’ve ever spent time complaining about due to its straightforward nature), is saving the best reliever, AKA “closer”, until an uncertain save situation rolls around in the 9^th inning or extra innings.  I’ve written about this time after time on this blog, and it’s just based in such perplexing logic that I can’t understand how any grown man in charge of a baseball team can possibly not see how backwards an idea it is.

The first example that immediately came to mind was from Thursday, August, 28^th 2008.  I began typing the post before the game even ended.  The Phillies entered the bottom of the 8^th inning at Wrigley Field with a 3 run lead over the Chicago Cubs.  Ryan Madson (obviously), started the 8^th inning against the 9-1-2 hitters for the Cubs.  The Phillies entered the inning with a 91% chance to win the game.  Mike Fontenot (!!!) led off the inning with a home run.  4-2 game.  The next hitter, Alfonso Soriano hit a double.  With 0 outs, a runner on second, and the heart of the lineup looming, Manuel should have absolutely gone to Brad Lidge.  Ryan Madson was solid in 2008, but this was still one season prior to his striking out over one batter per inning and becoming truly dominant.  Also, Brad Lidge was perfect in 2008.  Rather than bringing in Lidge, or even warming him up, Manuel stuck with Madson who gave up a single to Ryan Theriot.  1^st and 3^rd, no outs, and the team’s Win Expectancy was down to 58%.  Manuel then decided to make a pitching change – Chad Durbin.  Durbin was solid in 2008, and Ryan Madson was clearly off that night, but Brad Lidge is the clear solution.  Durbin walked Lee to load the bases.  The Cubs were then favored to win the game with the Phillies up by two and the bases loaded.  Aramis Ramirez then hit a grand slam all but sealing the loss for the Phillies.  Brad Lidge didn’t pitch the 9^th, because there was no 9^th inning.  Good thing Manuel saved him for the save situation. 

The next game that came to mind was Game 135 of the 2011 season against the Marlins.  Mr. Musser, Mr. Mix (a close relative), and I were in attendance for the final series the Phillies would play in the Dolphins stadium.  The entire game was pretty much ridiculous with Roy Halladay pitching, a fan interference call that had to go to review, and extra innings.  We had to leave the game early to get to the airport, but I remember being furious watching Michael Stutes and David Herndon pitch a combined 5.2 IP (it would have been more, but the Marlins put Herndon out of his misery.  Madson never made an appearance in the 14 inning game and the Phillies had only used 4 relievers to the Marlins 7.  Maybe if Madson had been used, they could have literally outlasted the Marlins pen and Greg Dobbs would have had to come in to pitch. 

Likely the most recent example (and obvious example of just how much this drives me crazy) occurred in game 38 of this season.  The Phils were 17-20 going into the game, and I was already certain just how disastrous the season would be, and this still drove me insane.  The Phillies were up 3-0 going into the 8^th inning.  Antonio Bastardo was used to begin the inning.  A walk and a pop out later, and Paul Goldschmidt is due up with one out.  At this point, Papelbon should have been brought into the game.  Instead, Manuel let Bastardo pitch to Goldschmidt who singled.  First and third.  Manuel THEN lifted Bastardo for Papelbon.  If Bastardo isn’t even allowed to surrender a single, then he should undoubtedly not be allowed to pitch to one of the most dangerous hitters in the National League.  What made this situation even worse was the commentary from Wheels and TMac.  I’m going to copy and paste my rant from the game post:

‘You really don't want to use Papelbon for 5 out saves this early in the season.’  Who the HELL said you have to use Papelbon through the end of the 9th inning if he appears in the 8th inning?!  The reason he makes so much money is because he's one of the best relievers in MLB and definitely the best reliever on the Phillies.  Why save him for situations where the Phillies are up 3 or 4 runs in the 9th inning with no runners on base (3 runs = saveeeeee, 4 runs = his appearances on Monday and Tuesday of this week).  He should be used in the most pressing situations in the game almost regardless of the inning.  He DOESN'T need to pitch in the 9th inning.

If he comes into a game in the 8th inning, and throws a lot of pitches, then you can just use the next best option in the 9th to finish the game.  Think about it.  If Papelbon successfully keeps the lead at 3-1 in the 8th inning meanwhile throwing a lot of pitches, just use someone else to pitch the 9th.  If Papelbon did NOT appear in the 8th inning and Bastardo gave up the lead (let's assume a 3-3 score), Papelbon wouldn't be used in the 9th inning for the insane reason that it's not a SAVE situation.  So, Manuel would resort to using a lesser reliever in a tie game with ZERO wiggle room.  If you use a pitcher in a game where he cannot allow even one run, then I'm confident you can use the same pitcher in a game where he has the luxury of allowing 1 or 2 runs.

THIS IS HOW PEOPLE WHO BROADCAST AND MANAGE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL GAMES THINK.  It's disgusting.

Enough said.

We’ve used the “saving your best reliever” tag 22 times since the inception of the site (that doesn’t include any other related tags such as “Ryan Madson for high leverage spot”, 5 times).  The majority of which were in 2012.  We didn’t use tags all that frequently and we still were able to use it 22 times in about 6 seasons.  Insane.  Another reason it probably wasn’t used more during the 08-10 seasons was due to the fact that the Phillies had a pretty stacked team including the bullpen.  Even when Manuel used the wrong guy, it was usually at least a competent pitcher.  For example, in 2009 and 2010 (especially in 2010), Ryan Madson was a phenomenal pitcher.  In many instances, the highest leverage situations occur in the 8^th inning of baseball games.  During those two seasons, Madson was incredible, and probably was thrown into the correct situations by accident.  By the way, in 2009, Brad Lidge had a 7+ ERA, and he pitched 58.67 innings.  Horrendous.  Anyway… Part of the reason why the team has gotten increasingly worse over time is due to the fact that the bullpen has gotten worse, and Manuel’s managerial blunders could less frequently be covered up by his players proficiencies making his job that much more important, and making his mistakes that much more noticeable.    

HE WHO PURCHASES GNC PRODUCTS BUT CAN'T PITCH TO RHBs

Another favorite topic of mine included complaining about Manuel’s use of J.C. (whom we affectionately referred to as Jansas City Romero).  Fact: We tagged “Jansas City Romero” more times (39) than any other explicitly J.C. Romero tag combined (26).  One thing I’ll always remember about J.C. Romero was his wife who was with him on the float at the parade…

Another thing about J.C. Romero was that he always had a seemingly decent ERA with the Phillies.  He ALWAYS outperformed his FIP and xFIP.  In no season with the Phillies did Romero walk fewer than 5.8/9 IP.  That’s pretty insane.  Every inning he would walk 2/3 of a batter.  That’s pretty tough to do literally or figuratively.  One thing Romero always did pretty well was face LHB relative to RHB.  In 2008, he had an xFIP of 3.03 to go with a wOBA against of 0.171 versus LHB.  One thing Charlie Manuel NEVER did well, was use Romero as he was intended to be used: as a LOOGY.  Instead, in 2008-2010, Romero faced the following amount of LHB/RHB, respectively:

2008: 111/144

2009: 32/41

2010: 97/74

It only took Manuel 3 seasons to realize he should be used more against LHB.  It’s not like the Phillies had Brad Lidge, or Ryan Madson, or even a respectable Chad Durbin to face RHBs late in games. 

When thinking back about Jansas City Romero’s time here, I immediately recall several instances where Manuel used J.C. to pitch to Chipper Jones specifically, one of the greatest hitters since I’ve been alive.  Chipper’s platoon splits are better from the left side, but they’re relatively close.  In cases such as these, I’d undoubtedly look to the prospective pitcher’s platoon splits to determine the appropriate matchups, and the answer would almost always be something other than J.C. Romero. 

There were numerous posts where we complained about Manuel’s use of Romero.  He obviously used him incorrectly for many seasons as the batters faced stat (shown above) proves.  I’ll grant a little lee-way as some of those righties were undoubtedly a result of LHBs split up by a RHB.  That’s what makes Manuel’s insistence to keep Utley and Howard back-to-back for so many seasons so frustrating – he could see the exact benefit of breaking up LHBs on a near daily basis.  However, in many of the instances where Manuel preferred to keep Romero in the game so he could face the bookend lefties, the game was on the line during the righties ABs, and Manuel refused to acknowledge the urgency of the situation.